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8664 
App~al from the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District in and for the County of Salt Lake, 
I 
Honorable Ray VanCott, Judge. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
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READING PENNSYLVANIA, a 
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vs. 
MARDEN D. PEARSON, EDWARD A. CROFTS, 
and DWAIN J. PEARSON, d/b/a PEARSON 
and CROFTS, and ROBERT CORPORON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a declaratory judgmeEt holding 
that the Respondent, American Casualty Company, ~s not 
liable under their contract of insurance for loss to an auto-
mobile damaged by fire in the garage of the assured, Pearson 
and Crofts, a partnership, three of the Appellants. 
The Record will be referred to hereinafter as "R." and 
the Deposition of Robert Corporon as "D.". 
On October 4, 1955, the Defendant Corporon purchased 
a Cadillac automobile from the co-defendant partnership, 
Pearson and Crofts (D. 3). The sale to Corporon was com-
plete and the purchase price fully paid on October 4, 1955, 
(D. 10). 
Corporon took delivery of the car at that time and drove 
it until he returned on October 8, 1955, for installation of a 
trailer hitch (D. 10, 11 and 5) when work was commenced 
but further postponed until October 10, 1955, (D. 5). 
Corporon desired a specific result involving a peculiar 
manner for ?astenfng th;-hitCh (R. 11 and 12). When 
he came for completion of the work on October 10, 1955, 
Corporon himself drove his car into and all the time it was 
in the garage, even though it became necessary to move the 
vehicle to another part of the shop (R. 11, 12, and 14). No 
employee of 'Pearson and Crofts, at any time, drove or~ 
~:..:..:.....=.....:.•..::.--..-....~:'-~·~-=:-~ ·~. -· .:21' •• -·=·-..:.--- -- .r. •• • .....,_ ~·~ ...... - ...... -._..._. _:,.,. ___ __,.. ---- ... ~ ~-- -~ ... --. - -- ,.,, ~-...-- ~ 
physical contact with the car (R. 12). 
~.c......--·•·"···-· ......................... "'-'"'-----~-~ ................. __... ........... _ ... _~ ........ ----
Corporon not only supervised the remodeling and de-
sign of the trailer hitch itself after it had been taken from 
the old vehicle (R. 13), but also supervised, directed and 
managed the installation on the· new car (R. 13, D. 6 and 7). 
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A fire occurred while the trailer hitch was being welded 
doing extensive damage to the car (D. 8). 
Corporon commenced an action against Pearson and Crofts 
to recover the damage to the automobile, whereupon demand 
was made by both Pearson and Crofts and Corporon upon 
the Plaintiff, American Casualty Insurance Company, for a 
settlement of the claim under their contract of insurance 
with Pearson and Crofts styled "Comprehensive Liability 
Policy", attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A". 
The Plaintiff insurance company thereupon filed an 
action agiDnst botfi-~Corpoionari-d Pearson and. Crofts for a 
declaratory judgmenf -claiming that 'Pl~iintiff'S- policy, ex:-
- ' ·~-~_,. ___ ......... .:. ...... ~- -- - . -~Oil,.,__......,._,. _ _,.,~~-~ --'-----""-- --···~-~ 
eluding coverage for injury to property in the "care, custody 
or control of the ins~re~did n~t cove;the -fire. inciden[ 
The trial court ruled that the vehicle was in the care, 
custody, and control of the insured, ·Pearson and Crofts, and 
therefore the Plaintiff had no liabil~ty on its insurance 
policy and this appeal is taken from that decision. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
'POINT I 
THE TRIAL COUR.T ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE AUTOMOBILE WAS IN THE CARE, CUSTODY, 
AND CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANT AND AP-
PELLANT PE·ARSON AND CR·OFTS. 
POINT II 
THE GARAGE MUST HAVE DOMINION OVER THE 
VEHICLE IN ORDER TO HAVE CARE, CUSTODY, 
AND CONTROL. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE AUTOMOBILE WAS IN THE CARE, CUSTOPY, 
AND CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANT AND AP-
PELLANT; PEARSON AND CROFTS. 
Corporon never transferred to Pearson and Crofts care, 
custody, or control of the automobile. 
The cases are uniform in holding both that the mere 
working on property does not establish care, control, or 
custody in the repairman or garage keepe:r;, (Boswell vs. 
The Travelers 36 NJ Sup. Ct. 599, 120 A2d 250. Haerens vs. 
Commercial Casualty 279 P2d 211, 120 CA2d, Supp. 892), 
2nd that the fact that property is within a building owned 
and controlled by one does not give him care or custody of 
property within it (Cohen and Powell vs. Great American 
Indemnity Company, 127 Conn. 257, 16 A2d 354, 131 ALR 
.... ~4-· ~ 
~102, H,.2nraban Xfl State 57 Ind., 527). 
The Plaintiff can 'show no more than that the Defend-
ants Pearson and Crofts own the building where, and one 
of their workmen was employed in working on the vehicle 
when, the loss occurred. 
We submit, therefore, that if either care, custody, or 
control attaches here, then there are no conceivable situa-
tions which would expose the insurer to any risk under their 
garagekeeper's liability clause. The insurer would be ex-
cused where an explosion occurred in a service station if 
the station employee was filling the car with gas, replacing 
H fan belt, or filling the tires. No liability would attach if 
an oil plug were not replaced, a tire were over-pressured, or 
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~. fan belt. faultily replaced, all causing subsequent damage 
due to the negligence of the attendant, for the reason that 
his master had assumed care, custody or control when he 
conferred any service upon the vehicle. 
M· Morris and Com;Qany vs. Lymbe.rmans Mutt:ta1298 
NYS 227, holds that" 'control' and 'care' indicate possession 
€xclusive of that of anyone else." In this case the owner of 
the vehicle continued complete dominion and control of his 
car at all times to the exclusion of Pearson and Crofts. 
Examining the meaning of each of the w.ords in the 
phrase which, as said in the Boswell case (Supra), are in-
herently ambiguous wor.ds of art and should be construed 
against the insurer who wrote the contract, we see the 
following: 
Care: Care implies safekeeping, preservation, or secur-
ity. Words and Phrases Vol 6, p. 140 et. seq. Certainly the 
~ - .___....--:-,.,. 
vehicle here was in no sense "entrusted" to Pearson and 
Crofts for safekeeping, preservation or security. 
Control: To exercise a directing, restraining, or govern-
ing influence. W~rd_s_ a,nq Phrases Vol.-~·'-£~~ Certainly 
the complete supervision, dominion, control, and surveillance 
exercised by Corporon vitiates the possibility of a transfer 
of 'control' to the Defendant Pearson and Crofts. 
Custody : Custody means a keeping, guarding, care, 
watch, preservation or security of a thing within the im-
mediate personal care .of the pey.~on to l~\g;se custody it is 
subjected. Turner vs Coffin, ·73 Pac. !S~, 9. Idaho.· 338. 
Brierman-Danzie Corp. vs. Fire~ens Fund-Insll"r~~~~c<;"~p: 
any (115 NYS 2d 706) holds that "custody implies tempor-
ary physical control and assumption of responsibility for the 
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property". Webster's Unabridged Dictionary states that 
custody derives from the latin "custos", meaning a guard 
or watchman. 
Where the facts are, as here, that the owner of an 
automibile drives it into a garage, drives it on to a hoist, 
provides the garagekeeper with a prefabricated, peculiarly 
designed device for attachment thereto, instructs the gar-
agekeeper as to all installation, remains with his property 
at all times, superintends all the work which is done at his 
direction and under his supervision and instruction, and 
when the vehicle is moved always with the owner at the 
wheel, there is never any relinquishment by the owner, or 
transfer to the garagekeeper, of any of the incidents of 
care, control, or custody. 
POINT II 
THE GARAGE MUST HAVE DOMINION OVER THE 
VEHICLE IN ORDER TO HAVE CARE, CUSTODY, 
OR CONTROL. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "dominion" as follows: 
"Ownership, or right to property. Title to an article of 
property which arises from the power of disposition and 
the right of claiming it." 
In Blashfield Encyclopedia of Automotive Law and 
Practice, Section 4154, Pg 413, the text states: "Under an 
E-xception appearing in such policies (g·arage), as to property 
owned by the insured or property of others in his custody, 
the insurer is not liable for injury to property in which 
the insured ..... has either a general or a special interest." 
It is respectfully submitted that in the ordinary situa-
tion where an owner of a vehicle takes his car to a aaraae 
b ~ 
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for any type of repair, the moment the garage starts work 
upon the vehicle the garage automatically secures a Mech-
anic's Lien upon the vehicle. This lien can, and often does, 
develop into an ownership right, including the right of 
disposing of the vehicle and certainly the right of claiming 
ownership to the extent of selling the vehicle. 
In the case at Bar, the garage had previously been paid 
in full for the installation of the trailer hitch on the vehicle 
(D. 4 and 10). The owner, Corporon, at any time during 
the progress of repairs, had the right to order the garage 
to stop work and to leave with the vehicle, the garage having 
uo rights whatsoever in retaining possession of the car or 
holding it. The garage had no "general or special interest" 
whatsoever in the vehicle under the circumstances of the 
case at Bar. 
In the leading cas·e of State Automobile Mutual Insur-
ance Company vs. Connable J oest, Inc., 17 4 Tenn. 377, 125 
SW 2d ~' the Court states: 
V:/ 
" ... It is clear that the policy, which is one 
of indemnity, afforded coverage to the insured in 
the event of damage to the property of others, not 
rented, leased by, or in charge of the insured." 
" . . . the interest of the parties . . . was to 
exclude the insurance company from liability for 
claims £or damage to property under the control 
and management of the insured, whether by virtue 
of ownership, lease, rental, or having charge of the 
property under any other authority, or in any other 
capacity." 
In Sky vs. Keystone (Pa) 29A 2d 230, the Court pointed 
out that the words "in charge of" does not mean mere 
possession. The Court states: "Property is not in charge of 
the insured unless he has the right to exercise dominion 
or control over it." 
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In Cohen and Powell vs. Great American Indemnity 
Company, 16A 2d 354 (Conn.) the Court states, at Pg 355: 
"A person or thing is not in cha:rge of an in-
sured within the meaning of the pohcy unless he 
has the right to exercise d~minion o! controi over 
it. This element is present 1n every Illustration of 
the use of the phrase which comes to mind, for 
example, a nurse in charge of a c~ild, a warden in 
charge of a prison, a caretaker 1n charge of an 
estate". 
In Welborn vs. Ill. National Casualty Company, 106 
NE2nd 142 (Ill.) the Court states: 
"The exclusion pertains to (the insured's) own 
personal loss from damage to his own property". 
"It is perfectly logical to treat a car which 
the insured had rented from another as though it 
were his own for purposes of exclusion. Likewise, if 
he borrowed a car from a friend, and was tempor-
arily 'in charge of' such car, the same reasoning 
should apply." 
"Thus we treat the e~clusion . . . as though 
the terms in the exclusion have a related signifi-
cance, so that they apply to property owned by the 
insured, or which have a status which is logically 
treated the same as ownership for the purposes of 
the policy". 
In Vaughan vs. Home Indemnity Co. (Ga.) 71 SE 2d 
111, the Court states: 
"The plaintiff had custody of and control and 
dominion over the automobile at the time ... so as 
to render him 'in charge of' it and so as to bring 
it under exclusion." 
The fact that dominion over the vehicle is required in 
order for the exclusion under the policy to become effective 
i~ more readily apparent when we look at the very purpose 
of the exclusion. 
10 
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We submit that the reason for the exclusion is to pre-
vent an insured, garage keeper, from making claims against 
his own insurance company, repayment of which would 
fjnancially benefit the garage keeper. In other words, the 
insurance companies, quite properly, did not intend to enter-
tain claims wherein, in effect, the insured was making claim 
against himself. 
In Appleman Automobile Liability Insurance, at Page 
200, the text quotes the purpose of exclusion as follows: 
"Property owned by the insured and damaged 
by him personally could never form a proper basis 
of a claim as he could not, of course, be plaintiff 
and defendant in the same action . 
. . . There is entirely too much danger of the 
human element 'entering into the proper settlement 
of losses which, except for this exclusion, would 
otherwise be covered. The natural desire to escape 
payment of a loss personally would lead the policy-
holder to establish a certain situation, not in fact 
existent, or to exaggerate or color the facts in order 
to have the loss covered." 
We point out that in the usual situation where the gar-
age has incurred a substantial bill during the course of 
repairs of a customer's automobile, and then, through their 
own negligence, damaged the vehicle, the garage, without 
the exclusion, could encourage a claim against the insur-
2nce company, the payment of which would, of course, re-
sult in the payment of the garage's bill for services for the 
repairs prior to the garage's own negligence which resulted 
in the loss. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no dominion over the Corporon vehicle at 
the time of this loss and there was, therefore, no care, 
11 
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custody, and control under the meaning of the policy, and 
the defendants, Pearson and Crofts, are entitled to protec-
tion under the insurance policy. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN and CHAMBERLAIN and 
L. E. MIDGLEY, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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